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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines a number of issues related to competition in the
healthcare industry. In the first chapter, I estimate the supply and demand
behavior of participants in the MA market by utilizing the most recent avail-
able data. I use the estimated model to quantify the welfare effects of two
major changes in the MA market. The first is a possible change in the mar-
ket structure due to a proposed and currently challenged merger between two
major insurance firms. The second is a change to the payment rules due to
the introduction of the Quality Bonus Payment (QBP) as part of the Afford-
able Care Act (ACA), which was intended to reduce overpayments made to
MA plans and create incentives for quality improvement by basing payments
on the plans’ quality ratings. By conducting several counterfactual analyses,
I estimate that the merger would lead to a 5% decrease in consumer surplus,
and that costs would need to decrease by at least 9% in order to bring con-
sumer welfare back to the pre-merger levels. I also find that quality increases
after the introduction of the QBP were enough to offset lower payments made
to plans, which allowed the government to reduce spending without lowering
consumer surplus.
In the second chapter, I examine whether competition in the MA market
leads to higher plan quality. A linear mixed model as well as an ordinal
logistic regression are used to measure the effect of competition levels on
a plan’s quality rating. The results show that plans in more competitive
counties are more likely to have higher quality ratings.
In the third chapter, I study the pricing effects of mergers in the generic
drug market by looking at a case study of a merger between two major
pharmaceutical firms, Actavis and Watson Labs, which have a wide range of
overlapping products. In order to remedy market power increases as a result
of the merger, divestitures were required in 21 product markets. Unlike
previous literature, I examine two types of markets in which the merging
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firms were present, markets that involve divestitures and markets that do not.
Examining markets involving divestitures allows the cost efficiency effect to
be measured without any confounding market power effect. By using retail
and wholesale data I compare the price changes of the merging parties with
different control groups after the merger. I find that there was significant
cost efficiency realized in a year following the merger and that this effect
dominates the market power effect in non-divestiture markets. I also find that
divested products experienced a cost increase after the ownership change.
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CHAPTER 1
Welfare Impacts of Supply-Side Regulation in
Medicare Advantage
1.1 Introduction
Medicare is one of the largest components of the federal budget, accounting
for nearly 15% of federal spending in 2015. Under traditional Medicare or
Fee-For-Service (FFS) Medicare, the government pays directly for the health
care services that a beneficiary receives. As an alternative, Medicare Advan-
tage (MA) consists of privately offered healthcare plans which are heavily
subsidized by the government. Medicare Advantage was introduced in order
to give Medicare enrollees more options when choosing a plan. Nearly a third
of Medicare enrollees participate in a MA plan. This equates to 17 million
MA enrollees and over $150 billion spent on MA plans.
This paper considers the welfare effects of two major changes in the MA
market. The first is a possible market structure change caused by a proposed
and currently challenged merger between two major insurance firms, Aetna
and Humana. Competitive concerns frequently arise when discussing mergers
in the insurance industry, especially in the MA market because it is often
criticized for a lack of competition. Proponents argue that mergers would
lead to reduced costs and increased quality. However, since there are only
five national health insurers, any merger among them could lead to a severe
reduction in competition. The proposed merger between Aetna and Humana
would make the combined firm the largest MA insurer. Thus, this merger is
currently being investigated by the Department of Justice over concerns of a
reduction of competition in MA markets.
The second change is to the payment rules due to the implementation of
the Quality Bonus Payment (QBP). The QBP was introduced as a part of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 in order to bring payments to MA plans
closer to the cost under FFS and increase plan quality by linking payments
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made to plans with the plan’s quality rating. Figure B.1 shows that plan
quality ratings experienced a yearly increase from 2009 to 2016. However,
there is some uncertainty whether increased ratings would actually increase
consumer surplus. In some surveys, one third of responders indicated that
they do not consider quality ratings when making a plan choice but only
consider the premium and benefits. Furthermore, the QBP reduced cost
benchmarks and rebate percentages, which leads to higher premiums and
lower rebates and therefore lower consumer welfare. The end result of the
QBP is therefore ambiguous.
In order to evaluate the welfare effects of these two changes I construct a
structural model for the MA market by using the most recent available data
from 2014. The QBP changes were slowly introduced, with a demonstration
period occurring from 2012 to 2014. During this period, payments to MA
plans did not start to decline until 2014. 2014 is also the first year that
quality incentives were fully in effect due to the lag of data collection for star
rating measurement. Thus, as the most recent year with data available, 2014
is the only year that can be used for the analysis of both quality change and
payment reduction due to QBP.
The MA plan enrollees’ preferences are estimated by using a nested logit
demand model. I then use the estimates to predict each plan’s market share
as a function of the plan’s bid and characteristics, including plans’ quality
performance measured by star ratings. Also, by modeling the optimal bidding
behavior of MA plan providers I am able to recover each plan’s marginal cost
in each market.
Once the model is estimated it is used to analyze different counterfactual
scenarios in order to quantify the welfare impacts of the proposed merger
and the introduction of the QBP. The changes from both of these events
are simulated and the behavior of both consumers and producers under the
simulated changes is estimated using the model. The resulting consumer
surplus as well as the producer profit and government spending are then
calculated and analyzed to measure the impact.
The results show that the merger would lead to a 7% increase in prices as
well as a 5% decrease in consumer surplus. Although cost efficiency could
occur, it would require a 9% decrease in costs to offset the effects of increased
market power. I also find that the increased plan quality ratings observed
after the introduction of the QBP were more than enough to offset the de-
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creased plan payment. This allowed for lower government spending without
decreasing consumer welfare and also led to higher MA penetration rates,
which increased plan profits.
This paper is the first to estimate the effect of the Quality Bonus Payment
on consumer welfare and disentangles the contributing factors to it. It also
contributes to the merger literature by estimating the counterfactual effect
of the current proposed merger by Aetna and Humana and provides some
insights into antitrust issues.
Section 2 provides the background information of the MA program and
describes its payment details under QBP. Section 3 reviews previous litera-
ture on the MA market and summarizes their results. Section 4 constructs
a nested logit demand model and a competitive bidding model under QBP.
Sections 5 and 6 describe data and present the empirical results, respec-
tively. Section 7 examines the welfare consequences of several counterfactual
changes: a market structure change, quality changes, as well as payment rule
changes. Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Medicare Advantage Market
Medicare is a national social program that provides health insurance cover-
age to eligible beneficiaries who are elderly or disabled. Beginning in 1966,
Original Medicare, or Traditional Medicare, consists of Part A (hospital care)
and Part B (Medicare insurance). On a Fee-For-Service basis it directly pays
a percentage of the cost for any health care services that a enrollee receives.
Medicare Advantage plans provide an added level of flexibility for Medicare
enrollees. Medicare enrollees have the option of participating in a private plan
instead of the Original Medicare. MA plans are required to cover the same
standard benefits as Medicare Part A and Part B but have the freedom to
provide the benefits in a different way. For example, a plan can require higher
cost-sharing than the standard benefits but can make up for it by offering
lower out-of-pocket costs. Plans may also offer supplemental benefits that
are not covered under Original Medicare. These typically include vision,
dental, hearing, or Medicare Part D drug benefits. This allows providers to
create tailored plans to more closely reflect consumer preferences. Original
Medicare enrollees have the option of purchasing Medigap and a stand-alone
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prescription drug plan (PDP) for those additional benefits.
In 2006 the MA payment system went through a major overhaul by intro-
ducing a competitive bidding system. Prior to 2006 private MA plans were
paid a uniform capitation rate per enrollee within the same service area.
Under the competitive bidding system, the Center for Medicare and Medi-
caid Services (CMS) sets a benchmark capitation rate for each county. The
benchmark is based on the cost of providing an average beneficiary under
FFS spending had the enrollee chosen Original Medicare in the correspond-
ing county.
The 2006 reforms were intended to increase competition by requiring bids
from each plan. The bid represents the expected price the plan is willing
to accept in order to insure a standardized beneficiary with an actuarial
equivalent of the standard benefit package under Original Medicare within
the plan’s service area.1 The bid then will be compared to the benchmark of
the county which the plan covers to determine the payment and rebates. A
plan can span multiple counties, in which case the plan’s benchmark would
be enrollment-weighted average of the benchmarks of the counties covered. If
the bid is above the benchmark then enrollees of the plan must pay a premium
that is equal to the difference between the bid and the benchmark. The plans
then receive a payment per enrollee from the government equal to the risk
adjusted bid minus the premium. If the plan’s bid is below the benchmark
then the enrollees do not pay a premium. In this case the payment received
by the plan is the submitted bid after risk adjustment plus a rebate equal to
75% of the difference between the bid and the benchmark. Any rebate the
plan receives must be spent on reducing premiums, reducing cost sharing or
offering additional benefits for the plan enrollees on top of the basic coverage.
Established in 2007, the Star Rating system for MA plans was meant
to provide more information for consumers to make better informed plan
choices. More than 40 quality and performance measures are in effect for
MA plans with drug benefits (MA-PD), and more than 30 are in effect for
MA only plans (without drug benefits). The rating measures span five broad
catergories including Outcomes, Intermediate Outcomes, Patient Experience,
Access, and Process.2 The plans are rated on a 1 to 5 star scale with half
1The standardized beneficiary has a risk score of 1.0 to make it comparable among bids
from different plans as well as between bids and the relevant benchmark.
2From Star Rating Factsheet in 2014.
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star increments. 1 star represents poor performance, 3 stars represent average
performance, and 5 stars represents excellent performance.
In order to incentivize plans to improve performance or star ratings and
control government spending, the amendments to 2010 Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act introduced the Quality Bonus Program to link MA
payments to plans’ star ratings. The ACA kept the same bidding process as
before but it linked the determination of the benchmark and rebate percent-
age to star ratings. Under ACA, the benchmark can not exceed the pre-ACA
level. The changes were gradually phased in over a transition period starting
in 2012.3 The length of the transition period differed in counties depending
on the difference between the pre-ACA benchmark and the FFS cost esti-
mate in the county. The transition periods ranged from 2 to 4 years, with
the effects fully phased in starting from 2014 for counties with the smallest
difference between the new and old benchmarks.
Meanwhile, CMS announced that it would conduct a nationwide demon-
stration from 2012 through 2014 in order to show whether a scaled bonus
structure would lead to an improvement of plan quality. The demonstration
period made no changes to rebate percentage as in ACA, but it lowered the
star rating standard for qualifying for a quality bonus and also increased the
quality bonus percentage.
QBP demonstration applies the quality bonus to the pre-ACA benchmark,4
and the blended benchmark can be higher than pre-ACA benchmark for plans
with a star rating above 3. Table B.1 presents the quality bonus percentages
for different star ratings in different years starting from 2012. Table B.2 shows
the rebate percentage by star ratings in different years as well. Payments in
2012 and 2013 are higher under QBP demonstration than pre-ACA for plans
with a star rating more than 3. But the benchmarks started to be less
than the pre-ACA levels from 2014 in general. So the year 2014 is good for
3Under the ACA (or QBP), the benchmark is the blend of pre-ACA, and FFS Cost
Estimates × ( Applicable Percentages + Quality Bonuses). To determine the applicable
percentage, CMS ranks counties into four quartiles based on the average FFS cost per
capita of the most recent FFS rate rebasing year and assign the applicable percentages of
95 %, 100%, 107.5% and 115% to counties ranking in the fourth(highest), third, second,
and first(lowest) quartile, respectively. For quality bonus percentage, if the star rating is
4 or above, it is 1.5% in 2012, 3.0% in 2013, and 5.0% in 2014+. The rebate is a blend of
75% and 70% with star ratings of more than 4.5, or 65% with star ratings of 3.5 or 4, or
50% with star ratings of less than 3.
4Under QBP demonstration, the benchmark is the blend of Pre-ACA× (1+Quality
Bonus), and FFS× (Applicable Percentage + Quality Bonus).
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checking the effect of payment reduction compared to pre-ACA. Figure B.2
presents the pattern of the estimated nationwide standardized benchmarks
under different star ratings, the benchmarks under pre-ACA rules, and also
the FFS level, from 2012 to 2017 (Courtney, 2013).
1.3 Literature Review
The Medicare Advantage industry has been a frequent topic in the literature,
the majority of which involves the market before the ACA implementation
in 2012. As an alternative to Original Medicare, Medicare Advantage intro-
duces competition into publicly subsidized program. Whether MA plans cost
less than Medicare under FFS remains an intriguing question. According to
Landon et al (2012), private plans and public FFS Medicare have very differ-
ent cost structures which are not highly correlated. By exploiting a detailed
dataset from 2006 to 2011, Curto et al. (2014) estimate that private plans
have lower costs than FFS Medicare in approximately half the country. In
those markets, private plans can offer the same benefits as Original Medi-
care for 12% less. However, Miller (2014) adopted a dynamic model that
incorpocates the presence of switching costs and found that it costs more
for private plans to insure the same individual than FFS Medicare and firms
capture significant profits.
Another branch of literature examines the pass-through rate of CMS sub-
sidies. Song, Cutler, and Chernew (2012) studied the effect of benchmark
changes on plan bids among HMO plans and found that a $1 increase in
benchmarks leads to a $0.5 increase in bids. They also confirmed the exis-
tence of imperfect competition where both insurers and providers may pos-
sess market power. Cabral, Geruso, and Mahoney (2014) used payment floor
variation introduced in 2000 and found that instead of selection, competi-
tion played a vital role in the explanation of incomplete pass-through, which
varies from 13% to 74% depending on the degree of market power. Curto et
al. (2014) found a similar result as previous literature and estimated that a
$20 increase in the monthly benchmark rate leads plans to reduce their bids
by around $10.
Risk selection is also a very important topic in MA markets. Brown,et al.
(2014) assessed the effect of the risk adjustment of capitation payments to
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private MA plans on selection into MA plans and on the government’s total
cost of financing Medicare benefits. By comparing the selection patterns
for beneficiaries switching to MA with those remaining in FFS, they showed
that MA plans increased their effort to enroll those with higher scores but
much lower costs conditional on the risk score, and the overpayments from
government actually increased. Lustig (2007) constructed and estimated a
structural model where insurers make premium and coverage choices, and
derived the welfare loss resulting from market failures caused by adverse
selection in the Medicare Advantage market (Medicare + Choice program)
before 2003.
Studies on quality performance or star ratings are quite rare. Darden and
McCarthy (2014) and (2015) studied the effect of star ratings on both MA
plan enrollments and premiums through a regression discontinuity design.
They found that beneficiaries are more responsive to low rated plans than
high rated plans and that plans adjust premiums by around $20 relative to
plans below the threshold. Layton and Ryan (2015) is the first paper exploit-
ing the effect of Quality Bonus Program on improvement of plan qualities.
They found little evidence of improved quality with a higher dose of financial
incentives.
My work is very close to Town and Liu (2003), and Curto et al.(2014). Both
estimated the welfare effects of MA plans under different periods. Town and
Liu (2003) estimate welfare effects generated by MA plans under a uniform
capitated subsidy by using a discrete choice model before the implementa-
tion of competitive bidding system. Curto et al (2014) estimated a structural
model under the competitive bidding process from 2006 and 2011 after ac-
counting for both market power and risk selection before the ACA.
1.4 Model
This section outlines the analytical framework that will be used to create a
model of the MA market. A structural model is built that examines both
sides of the market, plan demand and producer pricing. Once the framework
is established, the model will then be used to estimate the parameters using
2014 Medicare data and finally the estimates will be used to conduct coun-




Insurance companies can sign multiple contracts with CMS. Each contract
has several plans, and each plan can span multiple counties (or service areas).
After 2012, CMS determines benchmark payment rates for different star rat-
ings in each county based on the historical fee-for-service cost and specific
formula as described above. After being assigned a benchmark for the service
area covered, each plan submits a standardized bid to CMS that estimates the
cost of providing the standard Medicare benefits for an enrollee with a risk
score normalized to 1. The plan’s payment and premium is then calculated
by comparing the benchmark with the bid submitted.
Let bj represent the bid of plan j and Bj represent the CMS benchmark for
plan j. Let qj stand for plan j’s overall quality star rating, and γj represent
the rebate percentage.
If the bid, bj, is above the benchmark, Bj, the plan charges a premium
premj equal to bj−Bj. The amount CMS pays to the plan for each enrollee,
i, is equal to the risk adjusted bid minus the premium: ribj − premj. If the
bid, bj, is below the benchmark, Bj, the plan charges no premium and CMS
pays the plan an amount equal to the risk adjusted bid ribj, plus a rebate
equal to γj(Bj − bj). Prior to the QBP under ACA, γj was a flat 75% for all
plans. However, after the QBP, γj depends on the plan’s quality.
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The payment received by the plan from both CMS and enrollees is therefore
ψj =
ribj bj > Bjribj + γj(Bj − bj) bj ≤ Bj
However, when a plan receives a rebate, the rebate cannot be retained as
profits but instead must be spent on additional benefits to the beneficiaries
enrolled, such as cost sharing reductions, premium reduction or extra supple-
mental benefit provisions like dental, vision, or drug prescription coverage.
Therefore, higher bids mean higher payments from CMS (with capitation)
and enrollees. But higher bids also mean lower market shares, since higher
5In 2014, which is the year the paper focuses on, γj is equal to 0.5 if 2.5 ≤ qj ≤ 3; is
0.65 if 3.5 ≤ qj ≤ 4, and is 0.7 if 4.5 ≤ qj ≤ 5.
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premiums or lower rebates (due to higher bids) render a plan less attractive
to consumers.
1.4.2 Demand
Demand follows a discrete-choice, nested logit model in the spirit of Berry
(1994) and Town and Liu (2003). Plans are differentiated products with
varying characteristics, such as age, quality and premium. Consumers make
purchase choices among the available plans based on both observed and un-
observed characteristics. I estimate the utility function using the aggregate
market share data representing consumers’ decision and plans’ observed char-
acteristics to reveal consumers’ preference.
Compared to a simple logit model, the nested logit model allows consumer
tastes to be correlated within the same group of products, which leads to
more reasonable substitution patterns. In Medicare Advantage, enrollees
can choose to enroll in a MA plan with Part D drug benefits (also MA-PD),
or without.6 In order to have better substitution estimates among plans, I
divide them into three exhaustive and mutually exclusive groups: Original
Medicare, MA plans offering Part D drug prescription, and MA plans not
offering Part D drug prescription.
Let m represent each county-year (market) and Jm represent the number
of MA plans available in the county-year m. Let g ∈ G represent the group,
and djg equal one if plan j belongs to group g, and zero otherwise. For each
plan j, the utility that individual i derives in the market m is given by:
Uijm = δjm +
∑
g




jmβ − αpjm + ηc + ηm + ξjm (1.2)
with
pjm =
bj −Bj bj ≥ Bj−γj(Bj − bj) bj ≤ Bj
And the utility of the outside good (j = 0), Original Medicare, is denoted
6For those who enroll in a MA without Part D drug benefits can choose to enroll in
stand-alone Prescription Drug Plans (PDP).
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as
Ui0m = εi0m (1.3)
Here, Uijm represents beneficiary i’s indirect utility from enrolling in plan
j in market m, x
′
jm is a vector of observed plan characteristics, including
plan experience, supplemental benefits, Part D drug prescription coverage,
plan quality, etc., and pjm represents the premium charged for basic benefits
when the bid is above the benchmark or rebates from the government when
the bid is below the benchmark. Since I do not have information on the
actual amount of the rebate spent on different categories and to make the
model more tractable, I follow Curto et.al(2014) and assume that the effect
of rebate dollars on demand is the same as the effect of a premium charged
by a plan.7
ηc and ηm are contract and market fixed effects, respectively, ξjm is an
unobserved (by researchers) demand shock to plan j, and εijm is a nested logit
error term that follows a type I extreme value distribution. Each consumer
attaches the same value, ω, to the products in the same group, and ω(λ) +
(1− λ)ε follows a extreme value distribution, where λ varies between 0 and
1. Following previous studies, the demand model can be estimated by the
following linear regression:




jmβ − αpjm + ηc + ηm + ξjm (1.5)
sjm is the market share of plan j as a fraction of all the potential beneficia-
ries including those who select Original Medicare in the county-year m. sj|gm
is the market share of plan j as a fraction of group g in the county-year m,
and s0m is the market share of beneficiaries who enroll in Original Medicare.
In the above equation there are two potentially endogenous variables, pjm,
the premium (or rebate) a plan charges (receives), and sj|gm, the market
share of plan j within group g. pjm depends on the bid a plan submits, which
is potentially correlated with the unobserved characteristics. Unobserved
7The hypothesis that the coefficient of a premium is just the negative of the coefficient
of rebate amounts passed the significance test in the regression of the effects of different
variables on the market share.
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changes in demand will lead to a change in both the overall market share of
the plan, sjm, as well as the market share of the plan within the plan group,
sj|gm, meaning the error term could be correlated with one of the independent
variables and lead to biased estimates.
To address the potential endogeneity, appropriate instruments must be
found that are uncorrelated with the unobserved characteristic, ξjm, or de-
mand shock, but are correlated with the endogenous variables. I follow the
spirit of Berry et.al.(1995) and Nevo (2001) to construct a set of instruments
and form GMM estimators.
To construct instrumental variables, we exploit supply side variations. The
first set of instruments include the numbers of hospitals in each market, the
enrollment weighted average of benchmarks in other counties covered by the
same plan, and the mean of the bids of other plans under the same contract
by a single firm. The number of hospitals affects insurers’ relative bargaining
power with health providers and thus influences their cost structure but is
unrelated to demand shocks. Since a plan operates in multiple counties or
markets and only sets one bid, bj, across markets, pjm is likely to be affected
by the competitive environment or cost structure in other counties involved.
The average of county benchmarks is a valid instrumental variable because
the benchmark is a good indicator of average cost in each county, and the
benchmarks in other counties covered by the plan affect the determination
of a plan’s bid (thus pjm in county j), but not the demand in the market
under consideration. Plans under the same contract should share similar
cost features, and bids reflect plans’ cost to a certain extent, thus the mean
number of bids could serve as an instrumental variable by the same reason
stated above.
The second set of instruments includes the number of plans offered in each
market, the number of contracts offered in each market.8 The number of
plans and contracts is correlated with plans’ within MA market share as well
as pjm since more plans mean more competition and therefore less market
share and lower price for each plan. However, they are correlated with the
error term since any changes in demand will not have an immediate effect
on which plans are already being offered in the market. This leads to six
instruments for the two endogenous variables.
8Each contract can contain multiple plans.
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1.4.3 Insurers’ Profit and Equilibrium
After observing the benchmark set by CMS for each county, insurers submit a
single bid for each plan they decide to offer. A plan can cover multiple coun-
ties with the benchmark equal to the expected enrollment weighted average
of the benchmark of each county it covers.
Based on the bidding rule, if bj is above the benchmark, Bj, the plan
receives a premium bj-Bj from each enrollee and rbj-(bj-Bj) from CMS; if bj
is below the benchmark, Bj, the plan receives rbj as payment, and γj(Bj-bj)
as a rebate based on plan’s quality. Since rebates cannot be kept as profit,
the plan will receive rbj for each enrollee as payment in both cases. However
the size of the bid which determines whether it charges a premium or receives
a rebate affects the market share from the utility function. Thus, firm’s profit
maximization can be described as follows.
Assume each firm, f , offers Jf plans and each plan, j ∈ Jf , covers m ∈ Tj








(rimbj − rimcjm) (1.6)
where rim is the risk score assigned to each individual i in market m repre-
senting the enrollee’s health status,9 and cjm is the cost of offering plan j in
market m.







r̄m(bj − cjm)Mmsjm(pj, p−j) (1.7)
where r̄m is average risk score of enrollees in the market m, Mm is the total
market size of market m, and Mmsjm(pj, p−j) is the number of beneficiaries
who enroll in plan j in market m.
In order to calculate insurers’ profits, the marginal cost is needed. However,
from equation (7), the first order conditions lead to more unknowns than the
number of equations since the cost of the same plan differs by county. I
follow the previous literature by assuming that each plan is maximizing the
9With the risk adjustment capitation payment in 2004, the problem of adverse selection
is less severe.
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In each market m (I will drop the market notation for now), Let Sjk = −dskmdbj ,
Ω∗jk =
1 if∃f : k, j ⊂ Jf0 otherwise
Let Ω be a matrix with Ωjk = Ω
∗
jk ∗ Sjk, then the FOC becomes:
s(p)− Ω(b− c) = 0 (1.10)
which implies that the cost for each plan in each county can be estimated by
the following equation:
c = b+ Ω−1s(p) (1.11)
where, Ω is the ownership matrix.
Let Ng denote the plans in the group g, and we can derive the market






















10The cost estimates will be biased as a result of this simplification, however, the bench-
mark reflects the economic conditions and is a good indicator of the cost level in a county.
The final benchmark that a plan makes bidding decision upon is the enrollment-weighted














and the cross price





, where the partial differentiation has the following
formula.





























The data used for the estimation is publicly provided by CMS and is mainly
from 2014, which is the most recent year when payment (or bidding) rates
are available. The dataset contains both plan and county level information.
2009 is the last year before the changes from the ACA were announced, while
2014 is the ending year of the demonstration period. Due to the timing of
data collection, all of the data on quality measurement used to determine
the bonus payments (benchmark and rebate percentage) in 2012 and most
of the data used to determine bonus payments in 2013 were collected before
the publication of QBP demonstration’s final specification so the incentives
to improve plan performance from the demonstration program will not have
a full effect until 2014. Quality data from 2009 and 2013 is also used for the
counterfactual estimation.
Beneficiaries make plan choice decisions based on the star ratings published
in the current year, but bonus payments are determined based on the previous
year’s star ratings. Therefore, data for quality ratings in the model estimation
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are from both 2013 and 2014. Contracts that do not have overall ratings in
2013 or 2014 are either new or have low enrollment. If a new MA contract
is provided by a firm that has no previous contracts with CMS in the past
three years, it is assigned a three-star rating for quality bonus purposes until
the plan generates enough data for the measurement. Otherwise it receives a
star rating equal to the enrollment weighted average of the existing contracts’
current star ratings. A low enrollment contract is referred to as a contract
that does not have enough enrollees to conduct the required data collection
in order to derive quality ratings and is excluded from receiving an overall
star ratings.
Following previous literature, the unit of observation is the plan-county-
year. The market share data for each MA plan and Original Medicare in every
county comes from Monthly Enrollment by CPSC and Enrollment Dashboard
Data. Plan bids and rebates come from MA plan payment files. Benchmark
data for each star rating and county level comes from the MA Ratebook.
Characteristics for each plan involved in the demand estimation come from
a variety of sources: Plan Benefit Data, Plan Crosswalk File and MA Land-
scape Source File.
The following plans are dropped from the data set: employer-sponsored
”800-series” MA plans which are selected by the employer instead of the
beneficiaries and also are usually not available to every potential purchaser,
MA Special-Needs Plans (SNP), which target a specific group (e.g.,ESRD),
PACE (Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly), and Demonstration
long-term care plans. I also dropped contracts with missing values or with
less than 500 enrollees.
Table B.4 shows the summary statistics of the sample in 2014. The data
covers nearly 1,500 counties with an average of around 9 plans offered per
county. Each plan covers around 7 counties on average.
Payments received by plans are computed by comparing the plan’s bid
with the CMS benchmark. Most plans submit bids that are lower than the
benchmark, with zero premium in 2014. Only 12% of plans submitted a
bid above the benchmark, and plan prices measured by either the premium
charged or rebate received by the plan, are averaged at around -$45.
Most plans offered supplemental benefits in at least some form. Nearly all
plans offered vision while slightly more than half offered dental or hearing.
Almost 80% of plans offered Part D drug benefits, which is an increase from
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only 64% in 2009. Plan qualities were mostly 3.5 stars and above, with only
17% of plans falling below 3.5 stars. This is in sharp contrast to 2009, when
over 64% of plans were rated 3 stars or lower.
1.6 Empirical Results
I begin with the results of the demand estimates coming from Equation
(1.4), which are presented in Table B.6. Results are presented for both OLS
and instrumental variables using all 6 instruments described in Section 4.2.
The coefficients presented represent the change in the log of a plan’s overall
market share as a function of the plan’s characteristics.
The main coefficients of interest are those of plan price and log market
share. In the OLS results these coefficients are −0.005 and −0.775, respec-
tively. However, as mentioned in Section 4.2, these variables may be corre-
lated with the error terms which would lead to biased estimates. Evidence of
endogeneity can be seen by comparing the OLS and IV results for these coef-
ficients, which show a dramatic difference. Furthermore, the OLS estimates
differ from results found in previous studies. The IV results are therefore
more reliable and will be used instead of OLS.
The results of the IV approach yields coefficients of −0.014 and 0.421 for
the plan price and log market share. These results are more reasonable and
closer in line with the findings of previous papers such as Curto et al (2014).
The price coefficient implies that a $1 increase in plan price will lead to a
roughly 0.8% decrease in market share. The coefficient for log(s̄) measures
the within group correlation for MA Part D plans, MA non Part D plans,
and Original Medicare. The results imply that there is a high degree of
substitutability within the three groups. The price and log share coefficients
will be used as α and σ, respectively, in the cost estimation as well as in
calculating the counterfactual bids.
Other parameters of interest are the dummy variables for plan quality.
Plans range in quality from 2 to 5 stars in 2014. The expected result is for
the quality coefficients to increase with the quality rating. The OLS results
lead to counter-intuitive findings, with the coefficients for 3 through 4.5 stars
decreasing rather than increasing. The IV results are more in line with ex-
pectations, with the exceptions that the coefficient for 2.5 stars is lower than
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that of 2 stars and that the coefficient for 3 stars is not significant. Despite
these differences, the quality coefficients in the IV results tell the expected
story that as quality increases, the market share will generally increase.
Looking at plan characteristics, the results are largely consistent between
OLS and IV, however the effects are stronger in the IV estimation. Plans
that offer Part D receive a significantly larger market share than plans that
do not. Plans that offer vision or dental also receive higher market shares.
Plans that offer hearing receive lower market shares, however, the coefficient
is insignificant. Lastly, new plans, which are plans that were not offered in
the previous year, received a significantly lower market share.
The results from Table B.6 imply values for α and λ of 0.014 and 0.421,
respectively. With these results the marginal costs for each plan can be
estimated using equation (1.11). The average plan cost is $658 and the
average markup (bj − cj) is $79. However, as seen in Figure B.3, there is a
wide variety of plan markups. The mean own-price elasticity of plans is 1.09,
which is a little smaller than previous literatures.
Following Small and Rosen (1981) and McFadden (1983), the expected
consumer surplus per month for a representative individual i from Medicare











where J represents the number of MA plans in the market m. By dividing
by the marginal utility of price, α, the consumer surplus is measured in
monetary terms. Figure B.4 depicts the distribution of consumer surplus
(per enrollee per month) in each county. It ranges from $20 to $90.
1.7 Counterfactuals
With the estimates for demand and marginal cost, counterfactual plan bids
can be estimated under different scenarios. This section presents the results
of two counterfactual analyses. The first examines the effects of a merger
between two major insurance companies while the second explores the effects
of changes resulting from the QBP.
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1.7.1 Market power
The U.S. Department of Justice has shown concerns and is trying to block
the proposed mergers among four of the biggest insurance companies. Two
potential mergers were announced in 2015: between Aetna and Humana, and
between Anthem and Cigna. Proponents of these deals advocate that the
mergers would increase insurers’ bargaining power and thus reduce medical
costs while also increasing product quality. However, these two deals would
reduce the number of national health insurers from 5 to 3, raising concerns
about competition.
The Anthem-Cigna merger was challenged on the basis of the commercial
large-employer market, while the merger of Aetna and Humana raised con-
cerns with the market for private Medicare health plans. About 30% of the
total Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in private MA plans, and compe-
tition should play a vital role in reducing premiums and keeping costs low.
However, according to a new Commonwealth Fund report, competition in
MA plans remains a problem in 97% of U.S. counties.
Aetna and Humana are both significant participants in the private Medi-
care Advantage market and the merger would make the combined firm the
largest Medicare Advantage insurer. As two national health plan providers,
Aetna and Humana make up around 26 percent of the Medicare Advantage
market share together. Based on the enrollment numbers in 2015, the com-
bined market share of Aetna and Humana would consist of more than 50% of
all Medicare Advantage enrollees in 15 states with more than 60% of enrollees
in 5 states. Together that means at the county (or market) level, Aetna and
Humana would account for more than 50% of all Medicare Advantage en-
rollees in 48 counties, with more than 75% of enrollees in 9 counties.11
Given the size of the combined firm, a merger between Aetna and Hu-
mana could potentially lead to a large decrease in competition in the Medi-
care Advantage market. As policy makers are making decisions on whether
to approve the merger, it would be helpful to have some concrete idea of
the impacts that the merger would have. In order to do so, I conduct a
counterfactual analysis in order to estimate the effects of the merger.
In this counterfactual scenario, I reformulate the ownership matrix, Ω∗,
such that the plans which were offered by the two firms separately (Aetna and
11Gretchen Jacobson et al. Data Note: Medicare Advantage Enrollment, by Firm, 2015.
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Humana) before the merger are now considered to be offered by a combined
firm. I assume plans do not change their characteristics and marginal costs
also remain the same after the merger.12 The postmerger equilibrium bids
are simulated using the demand estimates, recovered marginal costs and the
FOC from firms’ profit maximization problem. In order to calculate a single
counterfactual bid for each plan, Equation (11) must be modified to constrain
bids from the same plan in different counties to be equal. A new equation is
derived in the formula to allow for this.
Table B.7 presents the results of the counterfactual analysis measuring the
merger impact. The model predicts that the merger increases market power
and reduces MA participation rate. For the merging parties, the after-merger
prices increase by as much as 23%, and profits increase by 8.3%. The effect
on other rival firms in the merging market is comparatively smaller. It would
lead to an overall price increase of 7.3%, a reduction of Medicare Advantage
enrollment of 1.8%, and a resulting decrease of total consumer surplus of
4.5% in the competing counties.
If the merger did occur, there would likely be cost reductions in the merging
firm due to cost efficiency. If this is the case then there would be a resulting
decrease in price that could offset some of the increase due to the merger.
It is impossible to estimate the cost savings that would occur if the merger
was approved so instead I solve for the break even cost saving amount. This
is the decrease in costs such that the resulting decrease in price would bring
consumer surplus back to the pre-merger levels. In order to calculate this
break even amount, I assume that the merger will lead to a decrease in costs
of the merging firm. This cost decrease is assumed to be a fixed percentage
across all plans owned by the merging firms. The results suggest that in
order to restore consumer surplus to the original levels, the merger would
have to lead to a cost saving of at least 9.25%.
The results of the counterfactual analysis suggest that the proposed merger
between Aetna and Humana would lead to a large decrease in competition
in the MA market. Prices would increase significantly and consumers would
be left worse off. Although it is possible that cost savings could offset some
of this effect, it seems unlikely that the decrease in costs would be more than
the 9.25% required to bring consumer surplus back to normal levels.
12It makes sense since plans do not change characteristics often, at least not instantly,
and cost efficiency takes time to realize.
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In addition to the proposed merger, I also examine other counterfactual
scenarios regarding market power. In the first, I examine the effect of the
largest two firms merging, in the second I examine the effect of the largest
three firms merging, and finally I examine the effect of the largest firm being
forcibly split into two smaller firms. The results are given in Table B.8 and
show that if the largest firms were to merge, it would have even more drastic
effects than the merger between Aetna and Humana. Furthermore, splitting
the largest firm (Humana) would lead to a substantial decrease in prices and
increase in consumer surplus.
1.7.2 QBP Effects
The QBP substantially changed how payments to MA plans are made based
on their quality. In the QBP rules, plans with higher qualities face higher
benchmarks and receive larger rebates than plans with lower qualities. And
starting from 2014, both the benchmark and rebate percentage are be less
than the pre-ACA level. As seen from Figure B.1, the quality of plans greatly
increased between 2009 and 2014. 2009 is the year right before quality im-
provement incentives from QBP went in effect.
To examine how consumer welfare and government spending were affected
by quality changes and the different payment structure in QBP, I calculate
counterfactual results for a number of scenarios. These counterfactuals are
designed to isolate the effects of the quality increase as well as the effects of
the change in the payment structure and separately measure the effects of
each on consumer welfare. Starting with the baseline of the actual 2014 re-
sults, I change one or more conditions of the MA market and solve for a new
set of equilibrium bids under the new conditions incorporated. I then com-
pare the resulting consumer surplus, plan profit, and government spending.
Details of the counterfactual scenarios are as follows.
Counterfactual 1: I use plan characteristics from the baseline model
(2014), but change the payment structure from the QBP in 2014 to the
projected payment structure under pre-ACA. This means the counterfactual
benchmarks would be projected in 2014 without ACA implementation,13 and
13This projected benchmark is derived by following the procedure for yearly benchmark
adjustments prior to the ACA. Each year, the benchmark is increased by the National
Per Capita Medicare Advantage Growth Percentage (NPCMAGP). This rate is provided
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the rebate percentage would be now 75% for every plan regardless of plan
quality. This counterfactual quantifies the effect of the payment structure
change on consumer welfare and plan profits. The benchmark for each plan
is higher under the counterfactual as well as the rebate percentage.
In this scenario, plans benefit from both higher benchmarks as well as
higher rebate percentages. Even for a plan that does not change its bid, the
price that consumers face will be much lower because of the higher rebate.
This makes the plans more attractive to consumers, which gives the plans the
ability to raise their bids, in this case by an average of around 3%. However,
despite the increase in plan bids, the average plan price falls by over 100%
due to the increased rebate payments. This leads to an increase in MA
penetration from 23% to 26% and a dramatic increase in plan profits.
Consumers are also better off in this scenario, with consumer surplus in-
creasing by over 6%. However, since this is mainly driven by the lower prices
caused by the higher rebate payments, it will clearly come at the expense
of government spending, which increased by nearly 50$ per enrollee. This
should not come as a surprise since a major goal of the QBP was to lower
government spending.
Counterfactual 2: I use plan characteristics and payment structure from
2014 but use the plan quality from 2009. In order for this to be feasible, I
must make some assumptions on the change in plan qualities. From 2009
to 2014, around 50% of plans exist in both years. Even though the market
experienced some entry and exits, the total number of plans in these two
years is not very different.14 In the counterfatual, for plans that remain in
the market from 2009 to 2014, 2009’s quality will be available. For plans
that entered after 2009, a quality will be assigned based on the conditional
distribution of 2014 qualities. For example, most four star plans in 2014 were
likely to be either 3.5 or 4 stars in 2009. Therefore, four star plans in 2014 that
were not offered in 2009 will be assigned a higher probability of having a 3.5
or 4 star quality in 2009. This ensures that the overall quality distribution as
well as the transition distributions for the counterfactual qualities will match
annually by CMS. In order to calculate the projected benchmark, the NPCMAGP for
each year from 2010 - 2014 is combined to measure the combined growth rate. This
combined growth rate is then multiplied by the 2009 benchmark to determine what the
2014 benchmark would have been under the yearly adjustment process without the ACA
implementation.
141,899 plans in 2009 versus 1,618 plans in 2014.
21
the observed distributions.
Under this counterfactual analysis, we assume the quality change affects
only a plan’s fixed cost investment, but not the marginal cost. That is,
plans can increase fixed cost in each period to improve quality ratings, and
marginal cost remains the same as long as no other characteristics change.
This is the worst case scenario for consumers as they face low quality as
well as low rebate payments. This is clearly reflected in the results, where
consumer surplus drops by over 10% and MA penetration falls from 23%
to 18%. This in turn is detrimental to plan providers, who are forced to
lower their bids in order to stay attractive to consumers, leading to a 13%
decrease in price and a 5.7% decrease in plan profit. The only benefit from
this scenario is that government spending decreases since the payments under
QBP to poor quality plans are lower.
Counterfactual 3: I use 2009 quality characteristics and Pre-ACA pay-
ment structure. This counterfactual measures the combined effects of both
changes and is the closest picture to what would have occurred had the QBP
not been enacted. Under this scenario qualities are lowered but the bench-
marks and rebates made to plans are increased compared to the true values.
Figure B.5 shows the distribution of price changes under this circumstance.
The results of this counterfactual are a mix of the previous two. Consumer
surplus is lowered due to the lower plan quality, although it is not as low as
in counterfactual 2 because of the higher rebate payments. Plan profit is
lowered as the plans must lower their bid because of the lower quality but
MA penetration decreases to only 19%, again as a result of the higher rebate
payments. Government spending is higher than in counterfactual 1 because
of the higher benchmarks and rebates, but lower than in counterfactual 2
because of the lower plan quality.
The most interesting comparison is with the 2014 baseline. The comparison
demonstrates that the QBP was a resounding success. In the counterfactual
scenario, consumer surplus has dropped by nearly 10%, plan profit has de-
creased by over 3%, and government spending has increased by almost 5%.
This implies that all parties involved prefer the implementation of the QBP.
This is largely due to the increased plan quality in 2014. The higher quality
makes plans more attractive to customers, which allows the government to
spend less. The plans increase their bid while still preserving a high MA
penetration rate, thereby increasing consumer surplus and plan profit, all
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the while keeping government spending low.
Counterfactual 4: I use the plan characteristics and quality ratings from
2014 but the payment structure after 2017. This is intended to measure the
effects of payment rule after the QBP has been fully phased in.
The results show that in this scenario consumer surplus will decline com-
pared to the 2014 payment structure, largely because of the higher average
price that is a result of a lower benchmark for each plan. This also causes a
slightly lower MA penetration as well as lower plan profits. Consumer sur-
plus and government spending are also reduced. However, since we do not
have any information about how the equilibrium quality distribution is going
to be after the payment rule is finalized, it is hard to tell about the welfare
effects after taking quality change into consideration.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper investigates the effects of changes in the market structure of the
Medicare Advantage market by estimating a structural demand model as
well as a model of firms’ optimal bidding behavior. The results show that a
consolidation between Aetna and Humana, which is currently proposed and
being analyzed by the DOJ, would raise concerns about competition in many
of the MA markets. By constructing a counterfactual scenario in which the
two firms consummate the proposed merger I am able to give a concrete
estimate of the effects. I find that the merger would lead to a 23% increase
in the price of plans owned by the merging firms and a 7% increase in prices
overall, causing a 5% decrease in consumer surplus.
The paper also examines the effects of both quality and payment rule
changes after the introduction of the QBP. I use the estimated model to con-
duct additional counterfactual scenarios that separately analyze the welfare
effects of the different changes involved. I find that the changes after the in-
troduction of the QBP allowed consumer surplus to increase. It also allowed
plans’ variable profit to increase due to higher MA penetration rates, even
with a reduction in benchmarks and rebate percentages. However, since we
do not have estimates of fixed costs for each plan, it is hard to tell whether
producers’ total profit increases or not.
An implicit assumption of the empirical model is that in each year the MA
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market structure and the plan providers in each market are taken as given. It
would be ideal to form a dynamic model where firms decide whether to enter
the market, and if they enter, decide how much to invest in the beginning
of each period to improve quality. The premiums and final payments would
then be determined based on competitive bidding after observing the realized
star ratings. However, solving this game requires data that is not currently
available. This paper uses a static model with both quality and other char-
acteristics predetermined and only considers strategic bidding competition.
I also take the pre-ACA quality level as the counterfactual basis when esti-
mating the welfare effects of quality change. A promising future topic would
be to take quality investment into consideration and analyze the effect of the




Effect of Competition on Plan Quality in the
Medicare Advantage Market
2.1 Introduction
The Medicare Advantage (MA) market was introduced in order to increase
the level of competition in the Medicare market. Instead of enrolling in
Medicare directly through the government, Medicare Advantage plans allow
enrollees to choose a privately provided health insurance plan instead. The
goal is to foster competition through the private market and give consumers
a greater number of choices to better match their preferences.
In addition to competing in price, Medicare Advantage plans also com-
pete in quality. Plans choose how much to invest in order to provide better
customer service, including areas such as number of support staff employed,
how conflicts or appeals are handled, or how much coverage to offer for pre-
ventative care.
These decisions often involve major cost decisions. For example, in or-
der for a plan to provide the best customer service, it would need to hire
a sufficient number of customer service representatives. This would clearly
increase costs and therefore eat into potential profits. On the other hand,
having a reputation for poor customer service could scare off potential en-
rollees. Plans must therefore make trade-off decisions over how much to
invest in plan quality aspects.
Each year, customers are surveyed to rate the plan in which they are
currently enrolled. These quality ratings cover a number of different areas,
including preventative care, managing chronic conditions, ease of arranging
care, and customer service.
Each plan is then given a summary score that represents a combination of
each of the individual quality metrics. Summary scores range from 1 star,
representing the lowest quality, to 5 star, representing the highest quality,
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and can take half star ratings.
This paper examines the effect of competition on plan quality. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) is used to measure the level of competition in each
county, while the summary star rating is used as the measurement of plan
quality. If plans respond to competition by increasing their quality, then
there should be a clear difference in quality for plans in highly competitive
markets than plans in uncompetitive markets.
A linear mixed effect model as well as an ordinal logistic regression model
are estimated with HHI as the main variable of interest. Other controls are
included to account for other key plan characteristics, such as supplemental
coverage and plan age.
The results show that competition does play an important role in deter-
mining plan quality. A decrease in the HHI, which corresponds to an increase
in the level of competition, leads to higher plan quality on average. This is
true in both the linear mixed effect model as well as the ordinal regression.
The results suggest that plans do in fact compete in plan quality in addition
to price.
2.2 Literature Review
Although Medicare Advantage star ratings are a somewhat recent introduc-
tion, there have been a number of papers that investigate plan quality in
Medicare and other healthcare markets.
Darden and McCarthy (2014) and (2015) studied the effect of star ratings
on both MA plan enrollments and premiums through a regression disconti-
nuity design. They found that beneficiaries are more responsive to low rated
plans than high rated plans and that plans adjust premiums by around $20
relative to plans below the threshold.
Jin and Sorensen (2006) analyze how plan choice is influenced by report
cards detailing the plan quality measured by star ratings. They also control
for additional data and find that the coefficients on unpublished data are
significant, suggesting that consumers take into account more than just what
is included in published reports.
Dafney and Dranove (2008) also explore the effects of plan report cards,
in the case of Medicare HMO’s. They find that consumers are affected by
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report cards; however, they are also affect by market data not included in
the report cards. Furthermore, they find that the market data has a larger
effect than information in the report cards.
Other papers have also found that report cards have an effect on consumer
choice. Beaulieu (2002), Chernew, Gowrisankaran, and Scanlon (2001), Har-
ris (2002), Scanlon et al (2002), and Wedig and Tai-Seale (2002) all find a
significant relationship between quality and consumer enrollment. However,
Abraham et al (2006) do not find evidence of a report card’s effect. Farley
et al (2002) examines the effect of quality but on Medicaid enrollment and
does not find a statistically significant relationship.
Another main topic of research is the relationship between competition
and plan quality. Propper et al (2008) exploit a policy change to compare
differences in competition over time and examine the effect on the quality of
healthcare received. Propper et al (2004) also looks at the effect of competi-
tion and finds that increased competition actually leads to higher mortality
rates, although only slightly so.
Town and Liu (2003) look at the introduction of choice in the Medicare
HMO market and find that it led to substantial increases in both consumer
surplus and profit. Gowrisankaran and Town (2001) look at Medicare and
HMO in Southern California hospitals and find that for HMO’s, an increase
in competition leads to a decrease in mortality rates but for Medicare, an
increase in competition leads to an increase in mortality rates. Cooper et
al (2011) look at the effect of a change in quality of hospital care after a
recent reform. They find that quality improved faster in areas with higher
competition.
2.3 Methodology
The question of interest in this paper is whether competition in the Medicare
Advantage market leads plans to compete in plan quality. In order to answer
this question, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used to measure the
level of competition in each MA market and the summary star rating is used
to measure the quality of each plan.
The HHI is determined at the county, year level. Enrollment for each plan
is provided at the monthly level for each county, which is used to calculate
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the yearly enrollment for each plan. The HHI for each county in each year




it where sit is plan i’s market share in
year t. An HHI of 1 therefore represents a monopoly while an HHI close to
0 represents a competitive market.
In Medicare Advantage, quality is determined by customer surveys as well
as coverage information. Plans are rated separately in each of the following
dimensions:1
• Screenings, Tests and Vaccines: Plans are rated based on how well they
work to detect and prevent illness as well as maintaining the health of
enrollees. This could include whether plan members have access to
regular screenings or vaccines
• Managing Chronic Conditions: Plans are rated based on how well they
help members address long-lasting conditions. This could include the
types of care available for people with diabetes or high blood pressure.
• Member Experience: Plans are rated based on a member experience
survey. This survey is designed to collect information around members’
ease of getting appointments, the plan’s coordination with health care
services, as well as overall member ratings of the plan
• Member Complaints: Plans are rated based on how often members have
problems with the plan as well as how often they choose to leave the
plan. This also includes information about how the plan’s performance
has changed over time
• Customer Service: Plans are rated based on how they perform in key
customer service dimensions such as how quickly members were able to
receive treatment and how well the plan handles member appeals.
Plans receive a summary rating that is a combination of each of the dimen-
sions listed above. In each dimension, plans receive a star rating from 1 to 5.
The individual star ratings are then aggregated to form an overall rating for
the plan. This summary rating is the main metric used by customers when




In addition to the HHI, plan characteristics are included to control for
other factors that might affect plan quality. Plans have the option to offer
supplemental coverage in additional areas. This can include dental, vision, or
hearing coverage or Medicare Part D coverage. Additionally, the age of the
plan is included as older plans will have had a longer opportunity to improve
their service as well as to build a better reputation.
The Medicare Advantage market underwent major changes as a result of
the Affordable Care Act. The biggest change was the introduction of the
Quality Bonus Program (QBP), which was intended to incentivize plans to
increase their quality. It did so by providing a rebate to plans based on their
quality rating. Higher quality plans receive a higher rebate and thus plans
have a greater incentive to increase their plan quality.
The QBP changes changes were phased in gradually from 2010 to 2014
and coincides with a clear increase in the distribution of plan quality, as seen
in Figure C.1. In order to control for the changes in quality coming from the
QBP, yearly dummies are included in the regression.
The estimation is carried out at the plan, county, year level. MA plans
can cover multiple counties and therefore each plan may appear in multiple
observations for each year. A mixed model is therefore used to control for
the repeated observations. Fixed effects include the HHI as well as controls
for plan characteristics while random effects include the plan ID as well as
the year. This leads to the following regression:
Qict = β0+β1HHIct+β2V isionit+β3Dentalit+β4Hearingit+β5OffersD+
β6Ageit + β7Y eart + µ1PlanIDit + εict
where i is the plan, c is the county, and t is the year. For the random
effect, PlanID, we have E(µ1) = 0.
The values of plan quality can range from 1 to 5 in half star intervals,
although there are no plans with less than 2 stars. The quality is therefore
numeric; however, it only takes on 7 discrete values. Two estimation ap-
proaches are therefore used. The first approach is a linear mixed model with
the quality rating as a continuous variable.
The second approach is an ordinal logistic regression. This approach con-
siders each quality rating as an ordered discrete value. This is estimated as
a series of logistic regressions that consider the probability of the dependent
variable being less than or equal to a certain score in order to incorporate
the ordering. For example, let
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P1 = Prob(Quality ≤ 2stars)/Prob(Quality > 2stars)
P2 = Prob(Quality ≤ 2.5stars)/Prob(Quality > 2.5stars)
P3 = Prob(Quality ≤ 3stars)/Prob(Quality > 3stars)
...
P6 = Prob(Quality ≤ 4.5stars)/Prob(Quality > 4.5stars)
Then the ordinal logistic model becomes
ln(Pj) = αj + β1HHIct + β2V isionit + β3Dentalit + β4Hearingit +
β5OffersD + β6Ageit + µ1PlanIDit + µ2Y eart + εict
where j = 1...6
Note that each Pj has its own intercept, αj but the same coefficients β1−β6.
This means that the effect of each independent variable is the same for each
logit function and the αj represent different threshold values for the ordered
outcomes. Another way to think about this approach is as a latent variable
model. Suppose there is an underlying process for plan quality:
Q∗ = XTβ + ε




2 Q∗ ≤ α1
2.5 α1 < Q
∗ ≤ α2
3 α2 < Q
∗ ≤ α3
3.5 α3 < Q
∗ ≤ α4
4 α4 < Q
∗ ≤ α5
4.5 α5 < Q
∗ ≤ α6
5 Q∗ > α6
In this setup, the β coefficients represent the increase in the log odds scale
as a result of a change in the independent variables. Alternatively, an increase
in the independent variable would lead to a proportional increase of eβ in the
odds ratio. For example, plans that offer vision coverage would be eβ2 times
more likely to have 5 stars than 4.5 or lower stars (from the logit for P6).
Since the coefficients are the same in every logit, this would also imply that
plans that offer vision coverage are eβ2 times more likely to have 4.5 or 5
stars than to have 4 stars or lower (from the logit for P5) and so on.
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2.4 Data
The data used comes from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS). CMS provides detailed data on Medicare Advantage enrollment.
• Plan Quality: CMS provides the summary star rating for each MA plan
in each year. This rating is a combination of the plan’s ratings in each
quality dimension. Star ratings range from 1 to 5 stars, with values at
each whole or half star value. The star rating is only available for plans
starting in 2009.
• Plan Enrollment: CMS provides the number of enrollees for each plan
in each county for each month. The enrollment numbers are aggregated
to the yearly level and used to determine the HHI for each county.
• Plan Characteristics: CMS provides detailed information on each plan.
This includes any extra coverage the plan offers such as vision, dental,
hearing, or Medicare Part D. This also contains information on whether
the plan was newly introduced in a year.
The data used for the analysis is from 2009 - 2016. 2009 is the first year
that summary star ratings are available and 2017 ratings are not yet available.
Table C.1 through Table C.3 give a summary of the data used. As seen in
Table C.1, the average plan quality has steadily increased from 2009 to 2016.
This coincides with an increase in the supplemental coverage offered by plans,
as seen in Table C.2.
HHI is calculated at the county, year level. Figure C.2 shows the distribu-
tion of county HHI from 2009 - 2016. Most counties have HHI around 0.1;
however, there are some plans that show low levels of competition, with HHI
greater than 0.5. Table C.3 shows that the competition level decreased from
2009 - 2011 but then steadily increased in each subsequent year.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Simple Model
In order to first examine the relationship between competition and plan
quality, I plot the average plan quality across different HHI levels. The
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results, shown in Figure C.3, show a clear negative relationship. However,
this plot also reveals that the relationship appears to flatten out at around
HHI = 0.15. This suggests that competition plays an important role in
quality for highly competitive counties but not as much in low competition
counties.
In order to account for the different relationship for low and high compe-
tition counties, a linear spline will be used in the model specifications with
a knot at HHI = 0.15. This term then becomes HHILS = max(0, HHI −
0.15). To further test the relationship between HHI and quality, a simple
regression is estimated with only the HHI, HHI linear spline, and yearly
effects. The results, shown in Table C.4, support the hypothesis that com-
petition plays an important role in determining quality. The coefficient for
HHI is significantly negative, suggesting that increases in competition lead to
higher quality plans. However, the spline term nearly cancels out this effect,
meaning that once competition increases to around 0.15, further increases in
competition have little to no effect.
Although this indicates a strong relationship between competition and
quality, the results may be biased due to issues mentioned in previous sec-
tions. I therefore explore alternative approaches to obtain more accurate
estimates.
2.5.2 Linear Mixed Model
Table C.5 gives the results of the linear mixed model. As seen in the coeffi-
cient for HHI, competition plays a clear role in plan quality. As expected, the
coefficient on HHI is negative, meaning plans in more competitive counties
have higher quality on average. An increase in the HHI by 0.1, meaning the
county becomes less competitive, would on average lead to a 0.05 decrease
in the plan quality. However, for HHI above 0.15, meaning less competitive
counties, the effect of HHI now includes the liner spline term, meaning the
total effect is −0.521 + 0.503 = −0.018. This suggests that although compe-
tition still affects average quality, the effect is negligible in lower competition
counties.
The coefficient for plan age is significantly positive. This is to be expected,
as older plans have had longer to establish their customer service infrastruc-
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ture. Plans range from 1 to 39 years of age and for each additional year the
plan has existed, the quality will increase on average by 0.04. This makes
age a key driver of plan quality.
The coefficients on offering vision, hearing, and Part D coverage are all
positive, as expected. However, the coefficient for offering dental is negative.
Plans that offer one type of supplemental coverage are very likely to offer all
of vision, dental, and hearing. This can be seen from the correlation table in
Table C.6, which shows the correlation between vision, dental, and hearing
are all near 0.8. This means the negative coefficient for dental could be a
result of multicollinearity.
In order to make sure that potential multicollinearity is not affecting the
results, an alternative specification is estimated. Instead of including supple-
mental coverage offerings separately, a new variable is created that indicates
whether at least one of vision, dental, or hearing is offered. Part D cover-
age is still included separately since the correlation is much lower than other
supplemental coverage.
Table C.7 gives the results with the new specification and show that the
main results still hold. The coefficients for HHI, Part D, and plan age are
all similar to the previous results. The coefficient for offering any supple-
mental coverage is positive and indicates that offering at least some coverage
increases the quality by an average of 0.08 stars.
2.5.3 Ordered Logistic Regression
In order to ensure that the results are not affected by the discrete nature of
the dependent variable, an ordered logistic regression is also estimated. The
results, given in Table C.8, reach the same conclusion as the linear mixed
model. HHI is again significantly negative, indicating a more competitive
market increases the probability of a plan having a higher quality rating. The
coefficient for age is again significantly positive, as well as the coefficients for
both any supplemental coverage as well as Part D coverage.
In order to further check the robustness of the results, an ordered probit
model is also estimated. Table C.9 show that the results still hold under a
probit specification, with HHI having a significantly negative coefficient.
Another key assumption of the ordinal logistic regression is the assump-
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tion of proportional odds. Since the β coefficients are assumed to be the
same for each logit function, this assumes the fixed effects for the indepen-
dent variables are equal across each category of dependent variable. This
is a constraint that would not occur if the model was instead estimated as
independent logistic regressions, in which the coefficients are allowed to vary.
If this assumption does not hold, then the results would be invalid. For
example, if competition was more important in driving low quality plans to
increase their quality than high quality plans, then β1, the coefficient for
HHI, would be larger in the P1 = Prob(Quality ≤ 2stars)/Prob(Quality >
2stars) regression than in the P6 = Prob(Quality ≤ 4.5stars)/Prob(Quality >
4.5stars) regression.
In order to verify the validity of this assumption, separate logistic re-
gressions are estimated as in Harrell (2013). This allows the unconstrained
coefficients to be compared to determine if there is major deviation from the
proportional odds assumption. In this model there are 6 separate logistic
regressions to be estimated.
Figure C.4 shows the result of the separate estimations. In this chart, es-
timated logit scores under the unconstrained model are plotted for different
values of the independent variables. Each symbol represents one of the 6
separate logistic models. The horizontal distance between each symbol rep-
resents the slope in the independent regressions. Therefore, if the distance
between symbols is similar for each row, the slopes are roughly parallel and
therefore the coefficients are similar for each regression. This means the as-
sumption of proportional odds is valid. If, on the other hand, the horizontal
distance between symbols varies greatly between rows, then the slopes are
not parallel and therefore the assumption is violated.
As seen in Figure C.4, the slopes appear mostly parallel. For the variable
of interest in particular, HHI, appears to satisfy the condition of propor-
tional odds. Other variables also show support for the proportional odds
assumption.
2.5.4 County Level
As a final test of the robustness of the results, a county level model is esti-
mated. In this model, instead of using the plan, year as the unit of obser-
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vation, it is instead modeled at the county, year level. An average quality
rating for each county is computed by taking the enrollment weighted aver-
age of the star ratings for each plan offered in the county. Additionally, the
average age of plans in each county as well as the percent of plans that offer
supplemental coverage or Part D coverage are also calculated.
The regression equation then becomes:
Qct = β0 + β1HHIct + β2Supplementalct + β3PartDct + β4Agect + εct
Using this approach, the duplicated observations that come from repeated
plans are eliminated. Each county, year observation is unique. If plans
compete in quality then counties with higher competition should expect to
also see higher quality ratings.
The results in Table C.10 show the same findings as previous models. A
0.1 increase in a county’s HHI will on average lead to a 0.07 decrease in
the average star rating of plans in the county. As before, this effect is nearly
eliminated in counties with low competition. Additionally, supplemental and
Part D coverage are still associated with higher plan quality, as is plan age.
2.5.5 Decomposing Quality Changes
Once the model has been estimated, it can be used to analyze the changes in
quality over time. To do so, I calculate the average change in year over year
star rating as well as the change in each of the independent variables. This
allows the changes in quality to be decomposed into each factor by using the
coefficients from the estimated model.
The results in Figure C.5 show that plan age contributes the most to the
yearly changes, followed by HHI. There remains a large portion of the changes
that is unattributable to any of the independent variables. This leftover
effect is most likely due to changes coming from the incentives driven by the




Competition is an important feature of the Medicare Advantage market.
Given the large number of enrollees, it is vital that plans remain competi-
tive to protect consumer welfare. Competition in the MA market typically
revolves around price. However, plan quality is another essential dimension.
This paper examined whether competition in the MA market causes plans
to increase their quality.
The results clearly show that Medicare Advantage plans compete in qual-
ity. Plans in counties with higher levels of competition are found to have on
average higher plan quality. However, this effect is only seen in highly com-
petitive counties, whereas in less competitive counties the effect disappears.
Results from a linear mixed model as well as an ordinal logistic regression
both confirm that a lower HHI and therefore a more competitive county is
correlated with higher plan quality.
The results also showed that plans that offer supplemental coverage or
Medicare Part D coverage are more likely to have higher quality. Finally, the
older a plan, the higher the quality it will have on average.
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CHAPTER 3
The Effect of Mergers in the Generic Drug
Market
3.1 Introduction
Generic drugs are an enormous part of the U.S. drug market, accounting
for 88% of prescriptions dispensed in the U.S. in 2014. Generic drugs offer a
more affordable way for the average consumer to buy prescription medication,
accounting for only 28% of drug costs in 2014, and saving consumers an
estimated $250 billion in 2014 alone and more than $1.5 trillion in the past
decade.
However, the price of some generic drugs has risen substantially in recent
years. According to a study1 conducted by the US Government Account-
ability office, generic drug prices declined overall under Medicare Part D
from 2010 to 2015. Among 1,441 established generic drugs, there are more
than 300 generic drugs analyzed having experienced an extraordinary price
increase of 100 percent or more during the entire period of analysis. Also
this increase persisted for more than one year without declining. The lack
of competition has been a main factor contributing to the price increase of
generic drugs. The level of competition in this market is influenced by dif-
ferent factors such as industry consolidation and mergers, production cost,
gaps in production schedules, raw material shortages, and FDA regulations
regarding the approval of new generics.
Mergers are a common occurence in the generic drug market. There has
been a frenzy of recent mergers and some hypothesize that these mergers are
the main reasons for increases in the price of generic drugs.
However, the effect of a pharmaceutical merger on generic drug prices is
not immediately clear. On one hand a merger will increase the market share
of the merging firms and therefore could lead to lower competition and higher
1Generic drugs under medicare, 2016, GAO, Report to Congressional Requests
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markups. On the other hand a merger will likely lead to cost efficiency, as
the merging firms have newfound access to new distribution networks and
research capabilities. The end result on prices could therefore be an increase
or decrease.
This paper examines the different effects involved as a result of a pharma-
ceutical merger. I estimate the short, medium, and long term effects of the
merger in order to identify whether there is cost efficiency and the timing of
any cost efficiencies that occur. I examine the effects of the merger on both
the merging firms as well as the overall market.
I also examine the effectiveness of required divestitures as a means to pre-
serve competition. Divestitures are a common act by FTC to remedy certain
alleged anticompetitive effects. Divestitures occur when a merger between
two large pharmaceutical firms is proposed wherein one of the merging firms
is required to sell off its product to the third party in the market in order
to maintain the same number of competitors. This is usually required in
markets with relatively few competitors. I compare markets that involved
divestitures with markets that did not and examine how effective the divesti-
ture was at controlling price increases. This also allows me to isolate the
effect of cost efficiency from the market power effect.
I use data from a recent merger between two major pharmaceutical firms
to measure the pricing effects. Actavis and Watson Labs merged in Novem-
ber, 2012 to become the third largest generic provider. These two firms
were competing in a large number of markets prior to the merger and thus
price effects would be expected in many markets. Furthermore, the FTC
required divestitures in 21 markets as a condition of the merger, allowing the
examination of the effects of divestitures.
I find that there is evidence of both a short term market power effect as
well as a long term cost efficiency effect. The cost efficiency is observed
in the merging firm in all markets. However, the market power effect is
only observed in the markets that did not require divestiture. Furthermore,
I find that the divested products experienced an increase in cost following
the merger. These results suggest that divestitures are an effective way of
preventing price increases from mergers. However, the results also show that
cost efficiencies play a large role in evaluating the effects of a merger.
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3.2 Literature Review
Mergers have been a frequent source of research given the large impact they
could have on consumer surplus. The main focus of the literature is measur-
ing the change in competitiveness in the market by examining changes in the
market price after the merger.
Ashenfelter et al (2013) look at a merger in the appliance industry. By
comparing markets with large changes in concentration to markets with lower
changes in concentration, they find that the merger led to significant increases
in prices. Additionally, they found that the merger led to a decrease in the
amount of variety in appliances.
Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010) explore the effectiveness of the antitrust
review process by examining the price effects from 5 recent mergers. They
find that although the mergers were allowed to occur, four out of the five
mergers led to significant increases in price.
Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) examine a merger in the airline industry.
They compare price increases in routes where both firms were previously
competing versus routes where only one of the firms was participating. They
find that prices where one of the merging firms was a potential entrant rose
more than routes where both were already competing. Borenstein (1990)
also studies mergers in the airline industry by exploring mergers that lead
to dominance of a particular airport after the merger. He finds that the
increased market power allows airlines to raise prices, not just on previously
competitive routes but also on routes where there was no active competition.
Simpson and Taylor (2008) use a difference in difference approach to mea-
sure the price change in the retail gasoline market. Although the merger
increased the market of the merging firm by nearly 10 percent, they find no
evidence that the merger led to higher prices.
Winston et al (2011) analyze the effects of two mergers in the railroad
industry. They explore the pricing effects in the grain transportation market
and find that although there was concern that both mergers could lead to
price increases, there is no evidence in either case and the effects on consumer
surplus are negligible.
Most merger literature focuses on the short term effects driven by changes
in the competition level. However, mergers can also bring about longer term
effects driven by consolidation and cost efficiency. These longer term effects
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are often missed when looking only at a short time window. Furthermore,
since any economies of scale will have the opposite effects of competitive
effects, it can be hard to disentangle the two effects.
Agostini et al (2012) investigate the effects of a merger in the market for
pension fund managers. They simulate a merger that includes economies of
scale. However, despite the efficiency gains, they still find that prices will
increase as a result of the merger.
Focarelli and Panetta (2003) explore not just the short term merger effects
in the banking industry but also the existence of longer term effects. They
find that while there are short term market power effects that lead to price
increases, there is also evidence of long run efficiency gains that dominate
the short run price increases. This implies that the merger actually led to
more beneficial prices for consumers.
Sapienza (2002) also investigates the effect of a merger in the banking
industry, with a focus on the market for bank loans. He finds that mergers of
small banks actually benefit borrowers through lower interest rates but that
when larger banks merge, they are able to use the increased market power to
lower the interest rates for borrowers. He also finds that when large banks
merge, they reduce the supply of loans to small borrowers.
Sweeting (2010) looks at mergers in the radio industry but instead of ex-
ploring the pricing effects, he examines product differentiation. He finds that
after a merger, radio stations become more similar to competitors, which
causes changes in market share as listeners move from competitors to the
merging station. This also has the effect of reducing the amount of differen-
tiation in the market, which can hurt consumers but is not always examined
in traditional pricing analysis. However, Berry and Waldfogel (2001) also
examine the radio industry and find that increased consolidation increases
the amount of variety.
3.3 Industry Details
Entry in the drug market is an expensive process. New drugs must submit
extensive clinical tests to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in order
to prove that the drug is safe and effective. Once a new drug is approved, a
patent is granted that gives exclusive rights for 20 years after the drug was
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invented.
Pharmaceutical firms can often extend the duration of their patent. Firms
can apply to extend the patent based on time lost during research and trials.
Furthermore, if a drug can be shown to have a secondary effect, then it can
apply for a new patent, allowing the firm’s monopoly to be extended.
Many legal avenues designed to promote competition and consumer welfare
can often be abused by pharmaceutical firms to do just the opposite. The
first generic drug to reach the market is awarded 180 days of exclusivity to
encourage generic entry. However, name brand firms often license so called
”authorized generics”, which are in fact the same product but sold under a
different name in order to effectively extend their patent by 180 days.
Another legal avenue designed to protect consumers are citizen petitions,
whereby anybody can petition the FDA to delay the implementation of a
generic drug. However, these petitions are almost always filed by pharma-
ceutical firms seeking to delay additional competition. When these petitions
are filed, the patent duration is effectively extended until the petition is set-
tled.
Finally, pharmaceutical firms often abuse patent law in order to increase
the cost of entry. firms can file vague or broad patents to force other firms to
spend time and money in litigation. Additionally, some name brands engage
in ”pay for delay” tactics, in which they pay a generic firm not to enter the
market.
Once a drug’s patent has expired, other firms can begin marketing generic
versions of the drug. In order to do so, the firm must file an Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA) to the FDA. In order to be approved, the
application must show that the generic drug is biologically identical to the
name brand drug, meaning the generic drug has the same active ingredients,
has the same intended effects, and has the same intake method.
The cost of submitting an ANDA can be quite high. Each ANDA costs
around $600,000 on average. Once submitted, the firm must wait for a re-
sponse, which takes on average 17 months. Additionally, 93% of applications
are rejected in the first review and another 66% are rejected in the second
review.
Furthermore, submitting an ANDA can often be made difficult by the firm
producing the branded drug. In order to prove that the generic drug is bio-
logically identical to the branded drug, the two drugs need to be compared.
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This typically requires around 1,500 - 3,000 doses of the branded drug. How-
ever, many firms refuse to provide sufficient quantities of the branded drug.
This means that the generic firm cannot gather the required evidence to
submit an ANDA.
Given the legal and regulatory hurdles involved, it can be costly for new
firms to enter the generic market. Approval from the FTC represents a sig-
nificant barrier to entry, giving firms that have already entered the market
a degree of market power, especially when there are a small number of com-
petitors in the market.
3.4 Merger Details
In April, 2012, Watson Pharmaceuticals announced its intention to acquire
Actavis Group for $5.9 Million. Prior to the merger, both firms were major
players in the generic drug industry. Watson was a New Jersey based com-
pany while Actavis was headquartered in Switzerland but had operations in
more than 40 countries. Watson was the fourth largest generic drug company
in the world, while Actavis was the ninth largest. The merger would have
made the company the third largest generic drug company globally.
The FTC filed a complaint that the merger would lead to a decrease in
competition in the generic drug market. Specifically, it concluded that there
were a number of markets in which both firms were competing with few other
competitors. A merger would leave these markets with so few competitors
that there would be significant market power concerns. The FTC required
that any market with fewer than 4 competitors, including potential entrants,
would be at risk of a significant decrease in competition and therefore would
require the merging firms to divest one of their products.
Additionally, there were many other markets where one of the two firms
was currently competing and the other firm was actively researching a new
product to introduce into the market. A merger would represent a decrease
in the number of future competitors in these markets. Finally, there were also
markets in which one firm was a competitor but the other was a potential
entrant. A merger could also lead to a decrease in competition in these
markets.
As part of a settlement, the FTC required Actavis and Watson to divest
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some of its holdings in order to satisfy concerns over competition in many
markets. The FTC identified 21 markets where the merger would lead to
significant reductions in competition. Of these, both firms were competitors
in 7 markets. In another 8, one of the firms were actively developing new
products. In the last 6, one of the firms was a potential entrant into the
market.
In these 21 markets, either Actavis or Watson was required to divest their
holdings to a third party, with the FTC specifying which firm was required
to divest their holdings. The level of divestiture required for this merger
was quite significant. At the time of the merger, the settlement represented
the second largest divestiture requirement even though it was only the fifth
largest generic drug merger.
3.5 Model
The goal of the model is to estimate the effects of the merger on the market
prices. However, different effects could occur at different times. Cost efficien-
cies are generally not realized immediately and can only be seen in the long
run. However, because there are barriers to entry in the form of FTC ap-
proval, there may be market power effects that start soon after the merger.
Therefore, in order to better examine the dynamics of the price changes,
separate effects are estimated for the short, medium, and long term.
Additionally, the merger will have different impacts on different firms.
The merger will have the largest effect on the two firms who are merging.
However, there may still be indirect market effects that will affect other
firms. Furthermore, firms that were involved in the divestiture may face
even different effects since these products will involve transferring ownership
and making adjustments to shipping and distribution.
Finally, the merger may have different effects in different types of markets.
Markets that required a divestiture will not see a change in the number of
market participants whereas markets that did not require divestiture will see
a decrease in the number of competitors.
In order to be able to investigate all of the effects involved in each market,
separate regressions are run for each market type. Additionally, in each
regression, the firms are separated into merging firms, which include the two
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firms that are directly involved in the merger, rival firms, which are other
market participants, and divested firms, which are firms to which one of the
products is being divested.
To measure the possible differences in timing, indicators are included for
short term, defined as within 5 months post merger, medium term, defined
as 6-11 months post merger, and long term, defined as 12 or more months
post merger. Including these indicators separately will allow the dynamics
of the price changes to be more easily observed.
Finally, additional variables are included to control for other factors. A
time trend is included to control for market changes in price. Characteristics
of each drug, such as the ingestion method or dosage, are also included. I
also explore different fixed effects, including at the market, dosage, and firm
level.
The estimated regression is then given by
Pit = αXi + β0t
+β1Post
0−5
t Mergei + β2Post
6−11





t Rivali + β5Post
6−11





t Divesti + β8Post
6−11
t Divesti + β9Post
12+
t Divesti + εit
where
• Pit is the log price of drug i in month t
• Xi represents a vector of characteristics for drug i, such as dosage
• t is the month index with the merger announcement occurring at t = 0
• Post0−5t = 1 if month is between the first and fifth month after the
month has accrued
• Post6−11t = 1 if month is between the sixth and eleventh month after
the month has accrued
• Post12+t = 1 if month is 12 or more months after merger
• Mergeri = 1 if firm is involved in the merger (Actavis or Watson Labs)
• Rivali = 1 if firm was competing with the merging parties directly
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• Divesti = 1 if firm purchased the divested asset part from the merging
group.
This setup allows the various effects of the merger to be calculated and
compared between different groups. The short term effects in the merging
market are given by β1, β4, and β7 while the long term effects are given by
β3, β6, and β9.
3.5.1 Hypothesized Results
Based on the regression setup, there are a number of market hypotheses that
can be tested.
Hypothesis 1 There will be a short term increase in the price of the merging
firm in non divested markets (β1 > 0) but not in divested markets (β1 ≤ 0)
Immediately following the merger, the market share of the merging firm
in a non divested market should increase. This will lead to an increase in
market power for the merging firm, which could be used to increase prices.
However, in divested markets, the merging firm will see no increase in market
share and thus we should not expect any such increase in prices.
Hypothesis 2 There will be a long term decrease in the price of the merging
firm in all markets (β3 < 0)
In the long term, the cost efficiency should develop and the costs of the
merging firm should decrease, allowing the firm to lower its price.
Hypothesis 3 There will be a long term decrease in the price of rival firms
in all markets (β6 < 0)
The decrease in the price of the merging firm will increase competition in
the market and other firms will be forced to decrease their price in order to




I use pricing and market share data to examine the merger of Actavis and
Watson Labs that occurred in November, 2012. At the time, Watson was the
fourth largest generic drug supplier and Actavis was the ninth largest while
the merger moved the combined firm into third place.
The FTC required divestitures in 15 markets. 7 of these markets required
divestiture of existing products while the other 8 required divestiture of a
product that is in development. I use data from these markets. Addition-
ally, Watson and Actavis were competing in many other markets in which
divestitures were not required. I use data from these markets to compare to
markets with divestiture.
3.6.2 Sample Creation
The data includes monthly pricing and market share data on generic drug
markets. A market is defined by the brand name drug and includes all firms
that are producing a generic version of the brand name drug. Some markets
involve multiple dosages, where each firm produces more than one version
of the same drug with differing dosages, i.e. 5mg and 10mg. Prices for
differing dosages tend to follow the same patterns with different intercepts.
All available dosages are included for every market, with fixed effects included
to control for different dosages. Markets are chosen in each of the three
divestiture categories: full divestiture, potential entrant divestiture, and no
divestiture.
Data is used from February, 2010 through January, 2016. Although the
merger was finalized in November, 2012, it was announced in April, 2012.
Many of the merger effects can be expected to begin at the time of the
announcement. I therefore benchmark the time index, t = 0 to the month of
the merger announcement in April 2012.
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3.6.3 Data Summary
Table D.1 gives a summary of the data and markets involved in the analysis.
Furthermore, I explore the dynamics of the ricing and merger. Figure D.1
shows the average percent change in price for firms after the merger in the
short, medium, and long term. The results show that in the short run, there
are increases in price for all types of firms. However, in the medium and
long term, there are significant decreases in the price, particularly for the
merging firm. This is consistent with the theory that there would be short
term market power effects but longer term cost efficiency effect.
Figure D.2 shows a similar conclusion by examining the pricing path of
firms in one of the non divestiture markets. After the merger, there is a
clear increase in the market price, and in particular of all the dosages from
Actavis. However, in the longer term, prices start to steadily drop and the
long run price of Actavis ends up lower than the pre merger prices.
3.7 Results
In order to first investigate the merger dynamics, all market types (divesti-
ture, non divestiture, and potential entrant) are combined. The results, given
in Table D.2, show there is a clear decrease in price in the long run following
the merger. This can be seen most notably in the merging firm but also
in the rival firm. Furthermore, this decrease is not seen in the short run
effects, where the price of the merging firm increases slightly, although not
significantly, immediately following the merger.
In order to get a better sense for the different dynamics involved, the
different market types are next investigated separately.
The results for the divestiture market in Table D.3 show clear evidence
of long term cost efficiency. Although both β0−5M and β
6−11
M are insignificant,
β12+M is significantly negative. There is also a decreasing trend over time, with
|β0−5M | < |β
6−11
M | < |β
12+
M |. This suggests that the price of the merging firm
stays the same for the first year after the merger but dramatically decreases
in the long run.
This is consistent with the theory that the cost reductions from cost ef-
ficiency take some time to be realized. These markets involve divestiture,
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meaning there is no increase in market power following the merger and there-
fore any change in price should be coming solely from cost efficiency. Since
the only observed change in price is in the long run, it suggests that the
merging firm was not able to capitalize on cost efficiency for at least a year.
A similar pattern occurs in the rival firms. The coefficient for β0−5R is
practically 0 but β6−11R and β
12+
R become more negative. Although they are
not significant, this is the pattern that would be expected given the results
of the merging firm. The rival firms must stay competitive, and thus drop
their prices to follow the price decrease in the merging firm. However, due to
the lack of cost efficiency, the rival firms are not able to decrease their prices
to the same extent as the merging firm.
The prices of the divested firm slightly increase over time. Although it is
not significant, the fact that all coefficients for divested firms are positive as
opposed to both the merging and rival firms implies the costs for divested
firms may be increasing. If the costs of divested firms were decreasing or
even staying the same, the firm should reduce their price in order to stay
competitive in the market. However, prices for divested firms are increasing,
even in the months immediately following the divestiture. This is consistent
with the idea that divested firms may end up having higher costs as a result
of new marketing and integration costs.
The effects of cost efficiency can also be seen in the potential entrant
market in Table D.4. As in the divestiture markets, the coefficient for β12+M
is significantly negative in the potential entrant markets. In the potential
entrant market, the coefficients for β0−5M and β
6−11
M are also negative, although
they are not significant and smaller in magnitude than β12+M . This again
suggests that the full cost benefits from cost efficiency are not realized until
at least one year following the merger.
Similar to the divestiture markets, the price of rival firms in the potential
entrant markets also decreases. The coefficients on β0−5R , β
6−11
R , and β
12+
R
are all negative. However, β12+R is less than β
12+
M , suggesting that while rival
firms decrease their prices in order to stay competitive with the merging firm,
they are again not able to match the cost savings experienced in the merging
firm.
The results for markets without divestitures in Table D.5 also show evi-
dence of long term cost efficiency but suggest some market power effects from
the merger. Similar to the other two types of markets, β12+M is significantly
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negative. However, in non divested markets, β0−5M is positive. Since the di-
vestiture and potential entrant markets have shown that cost efficiency effects
only happen after at least 12 months, the only effects that would be present
during the first 12 months are those that are a result of the merger. This
implies that the merging firm is able to raise prices immediately following
the merger as a result of its increased market power.
In the long run, the effects of cost efficiency dominates the effects of in-
creased market power. In the long run, the non divested markets should
contain the effects of both the increased market power as well as the cost
efficiency. The end result on the merging firm’s prices could therefore be
positive or negative depending on the size of each effect. The coefficient of
β12+M will determine which effect is dominant as it contains both effects. In
this case, the coefficient is significantly negative, implying that the cost effi-
ciency effect dominates the market power effect and leads to lower prices for
the merging firm.
The existence of the market power effect is also apparent when comparing
β12+M across different market types. The coefficient for non divestiture mar-
kets is smaller in magnitude than both the divestiture and potential entrant
markets. This is consistent with the idea that although the merging firm
reaps the same cost efficiency in these markets, they will not decrease their
prices to the same extent as in other markets because they have an increased
market power in these markets.
Table D.5 also shows that the market price in non divested markets actually
increased rather than decreased. β0−5R , β
6−11
R , and β
12+
R are all positive. This
is in contrast to both divestiture and potential entrant markets, where these
coefficients were negative. This suggests that although the merging firm is
decreasing their prices in the long term, the rival firms are not able to match
the price drop of the merging firm. This would suggest that the merger is
actually decreasing the amount of market competition and leading to higher
prices for most firms.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper investigated the effects of a merger in the generic drug market. It
examined the competing effects of increased market power and cost efficiency
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on the prices of the merging parties. The short term and long term effects of a
major pharmaceutical merger were estimated. The estimation also explored
the effects of divestitures that were a condition of the merger.
The results consistently point to the presence of cost efficiency after the
merger. There were significant decreases in price across all market types;
however, these price decreases only occurred 12 months after the merger.
This suggests that cost efficiencies do not happen immediately after a merger
but rather take some time for the merging firm to fully realize the gains of
the merger.
There was also evidence of a market power effect, where the merging firm
is able to raise prices immediately following the merger. This is only found in
markets where the merging firm was not required to divest any holdings and
therefore experiences an increase in market share. In these markets, there
was a noticeable difference between the short term and long term pricing
effects following the merger, where the price increases immediately following
the merger and subsequently decreases in the long term. This suggests the
presence of both an immediate market power effect as well as a long term
cost efficiency effect, where the latter dominates the former.
Finally, divestitures are found to be effective in counteracting the market
power effects of the merger. Markets involving divestitures saw a short term
decrease in the market price whereas markets without divestiture saw an
increase in the market price following the merger. This would suggest that the
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Once the marginal costs have been estimated, they can be used to simulate
optimal bidding behavior under different scenarios. To do this the marginal
costs estimated from Equation (1.11) are used and the equation is rewritten to
solve for the bid. A critical difference in these calculations is when calculating
the marginal costs, the first order conditions are assumed to be satisfied at
every plan, county combination. This is a necessary assumption in order to
identify the marginal cost for each plan in each county.
This assumption is not needed when computing counterfactual bids. Let j
be the number of plan, county combinations and n be the number of unique
plans offered. When estimating marginal costs, there are j costs to be esti-
mated whereas when estimating the counterfactual bid, a plan must submit
the same bid in all counties where it is offered, meaning there are only n bids
to estimate.
Let
Γ = θ · Ω ·DbQ (A.1)
where:
θ is an n× j matrix with θil = 1 if i and l belong to the same plan
Ω is an n× j ownership matrix with Ωil = 1 if the plans in i and l are owned
by the same firm
DbQ is an n× j matrix of own and cross price derivatives
Then the counterfactual bid is given by
b = (Γ× φ)−1 × Γ× c+ φT ×Q (A.2)
where:
φ is a j × n matrix with φil = 1 if plan i is offered in county j
c is a j × 1 vector of estimated plan marginal costs
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b is a n× 1 vector of counterfactual bids
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APPENDIX B
Tables and Figures for Chapter 1
Figure B.1: Changes in Plan Quality from 2009 to 2016
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Table B.1: Quality Bonus Payment by Star Rating
Year 2.5 Stars 3 Stars 3.5 Stars 4 Stars 4.5 Stars 5 Stars
2012 0.0% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.0% 5.0%
2013 0.0% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.0% 5.0%
2014 0.0% 3.0% 3.5% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
2015+ 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Source: Health Watch Issue 69: The Medicare Advantage 5-Star Rating
Program and Its Implications for Actuaries
Table B.2: Rebate Percentage by Star Rating
Year 2.5 Stars 3 Stars 3.5 Stars 4 Stars 4.5 Stars 5 Stars
2012 66.7% 66.7% 71.7% 71.7% 73.3% 73.3%
2013 58.3% 58.3% 68.3% 68.3% 71.7% 71.7%
2014+ 50.0% 50.0% 65.0% 65.0% 70.0% 70.0%
Source: Health Watch Issue 69: The Medicare Advantage 5-Star Rating
Program and Its Implications for Actuaries
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Figure B.2: Benchmark Changes Under ACA
Source: Medicare Advantage Part C Revenue: Chanlleges Ahead, by Tim
Courtney,2011
61
Table B.3: Market Information
Overall Per County Per Plan
Number of Counties 1,409 7.6
Plans Offered 1,618 8.72
Table B.4: Summary Statistics
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Bid 749.734 71.203 404.210 961.150
Benchmark 812.790 63.055 414.177 990.390
Price −44.650 38.128 −294.290 41.770
Table B.5: Plan Characteristics
Percent of Plans













Figure B.3: Distribution of Plan Markups
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Table B.6: Demand Coefficients
OLS IV OLS IV
(Intercept) −2.394∗∗∗ −4.489∗∗∗ 2stars 1.171∗∗∗ 1.548∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.395) (0.253) (0.408)
Price −0.006 −0.020∗∗∗ 2.5stars 2.221∗∗∗ 2.043∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.671) (1.008)
log(s̄) 0.663∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 3stars 1.934∗∗ 2.092∗
(0.010) (0.023) (0.695) (1.044)
Offers Dental 0.257∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗ 3.5stars 1.703∗∗ 2.277∗∗
(0.033) (0.053) (0.564) (0.848)
Offers Vision 0.212∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 4stars 1.775∗∗∗ 2.256∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.093) (0.272) (0.339)
Offers Hearing 0.108∗ −0.008 4.5stars 2.095∗∗∗ 2.331∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.079) (0.331) (0.498)
Offers Part D 0.086∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 5stars 2.198∗∗∗ 2.567∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.023) (0.299) (0.342)
Average Risk Score −0.833∗∗∗ −1.399∗∗∗ New Plan −0.019 −1.079∗∗∗
(0.244) (0.367) (0.027) (0.043)
Has Deductible in Network −0.552∗ −1.460∗∗∗ PPO Plan −0.362 −0.729∗∗∗
(0.254) (0.382) (0.397) (0.198)




Num. obs. 2208 2208
RMSE 0.615 0.925
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table B.7: Merger Effects in Competing Counties
Without Merger With Merger Percent Change
Merging Firms’ Bids 784.3 792.3 1%
All Firms’ Bids 766.4 769.8 0.4%
Merging Firms’ Prices -34.8 -26.7 23.3%
All Firms’ Prices -49.2 -45.6 7.3%
Merging Firms’ Enrollment 531,790 517,385 -2.7%
All Firms’ Enrollment 2,747,229 2,699,281 -1.8%
Merging Firms’ Profit 40,610,916 43,929,614 8.3%
All Firms’ Profits 216,513,893 228,980,231 5.9%
Merging Firm’s Profit Per Enrollee 76.4 84.9 8.2%
Average Consumer Surplus 52.4 50.2 -4.2%
Total Consumer Surplus 143,715,751 135,580,591 -4.5%
Government Spending per Enrollee 778 783 0.6%
Figure B.4: Distribution of Average Consumer Surplus in Each County
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Table B.8: Market Changes Under Counterfactual Scenarios
Top 2 Firms Merge Top 3 Firms Merge Largest Firm Separated
(Humana, Pacificare) (Humana, Pacificare, Kaiser) (Humana)
Merging Firms’ Price 32.7% 37.8% -19.1%
All Firms’ Price 8.6% 9.2% -4.1%
Merging Firms’ Enrollment -4.7% -6.1% 2.9%
All Firm’s Enrollment -3.2% -3.8% 1.5%
Merging Firm’s Profit Per Enrollee 10.2% 11.6% -3.2%
All Firm’s Profit Per Enrollee 6.6% 6.9% -1.8%
Total Consumer Surplus -5.4% -6.0% 3.1%
Government Spending Per Enrollee 0.9% 1.2% -0.6%
Table B.9: Decomposing the QBP Effect
Consumer Profit Per Govt Average Profit MA
Counterfactual Scenario Surplus Enrollee Spending Price Per Plan Penetration
Baseline: 2014 53.4 79 785 -46.99 418,307 23%
Pre-ACA Payment structure 56.8 91 831 -105.2 440,591 26%
2009 Quality 47.8 71 767 -53.14 394,019 18%
Pre-ACA Payment, 2009 Quality 48.3 84 821 -118.61 405,928 19%
After 2017 Payment structure 48.6 70 762 -17.19 409,669 21%
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Tables and Figures for Chapter 2
Figure C.1: Changes in Plan Quality from 2009 to 2016
Table C.1: Summary Statistics by Plan
Year Number of Plans Average Plan Enrollment Average Star Rating Average Plan Age
1 2009 4863 33322.94 3.49 14.49
2 2010 4602 35932.05 3.26 15.08
3 2011 3848 43447.71 3.47 15.92
4 2012 3918 48719.70 3.62 16.47
5 2013 4005 49043.72 3.63 17.01
6 2014 4045 50986.94 3.74 17.57
7 2015 3903 52866.84 3.92 17.94
8 2016 3944 50733.72 4.00 18.52
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Table C.2: Supplemental Coverage by Plan
Year Percent Offer Dental Percent Offer Vision Percent Offer Hearing Percent Offer PartD
1 2009 0.67 0.88 0.73 0.45
2 2010 0.53 0.88 0.64 0.51
3 2011 0.56 0.85 0.68 0.62
4 2012 0.59 0.93 0.73 0.61
5 2013 0.63 0.92 0.71 0.56
6 2014 0.67 0.92 0.68 0.60
7 2015 0.68 0.93 0.75 0.62
8 2016 0.70 0.93 0.78 0.64
Table C.3: Summary Statistics by County
Year Number of Counties Average HHI Average Star Rating Average Plan Age
1 2009 3217 0.08 3.44 11.37
2 2010 3218 0.08 3.14 10.16
3 2011 3225 0.10 3.36 10.72
4 2012 3226 0.09 3.55 11.99
5 2013 3233 0.08 3.41 12.90
6 2014 3234 0.07 3.72 13.93
7 2015 3234 0.07 3.94 14.33
8 2016 3237 0.07 4.03 15.13
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Figure C.2: Distribution of County HHI
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Figure C.3: Relationship Between HHI and Plan Quality
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∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table C.6: Correlation Matrix for Supplemental Coverage
Vision Hearing Dental PartD
Vision 1.00 0.77 0.76 0.58
Hearing 0.77 1.00 0.76 0.43
Dental 0.76 0.76 1.00 0.48
PartD 0.58 0.43 0.48 1.00
Figure C.4: Proportional Odds Assumption
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HHI Spline at 0.15 0.523∗∗∗
(0.031)
Offers Any Supplemental 0.080∗∗∗
(0.001)
























∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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HHI Spline at 0.15 4.157∗∗∗
(0.167)
























∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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HHI Spline at 0.15 2.024∗∗∗
(0.092)
























∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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HHI Spline at 0.15 0.6884∗∗∗
(0.147)
Percent Offers Supplemental 0.275∗∗∗
(0.015)
Percent Offers PartD 0.066∗∗∗
(0.007)






















∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Figure C.5: Decomposing Quality Changes
79
APPENDIX D
Tables and Figures for Chapter 3
Table D.1: Market Statistics
Non Divested Potential Entrant Divested
Number of Markets 3 6 7
Firms per Market 10.00 5.17 7.57
Products per Market 18.67 14.50 20.71
Average Units Sold 24469.05 15107.33 19602.87
Average Price 110.79 146.18 196.79
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Table D.2: Combined Market Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 3.006∗∗∗ 3.406∗∗∗ 3.970∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.021) (0.046)
t 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Merger 0.732∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ −0.332∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.023) (0.056)
Rival 0.501∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.021) (0.026)
Mergeri ∗ PostMerger0−5t 0.037 0.046 0.052
(0.061) (0.041) (0.043)
Mergeri ∗ PostMerger6−11t −0.132∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.032) (0.043)
Mergeri ∗ PostMerger12+t −0.291∗∗∗ −0.348∗∗∗ −0.354∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.022) (0.030)
Rivali ∗ PostMerger0−5t −0.053 −0.052 −0.026
(0.050) (0.046) (0.034)
Rivali ∗ PostMerger6−11t −0.109∗∗ −0.105∗∗ −0.085∗∗
(0.061) (0.066) (0.045)
Rivali ∗ PostMerger12+t −0.142∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.019) (0.036)
Divesti ∗ PostMerger0−5t 0.083 0.045 0.083
(0.106) (0.055) (0.074)
Divesti ∗ PostMerger6−11t 0.072 0.045 0.088
(0.106) (0.055) (0.075)
Divesti ∗ PostMerger12+t 0.099 0.077∗ 0.090∗
(0.069) (0.046) (0.049)
Market Fixed Effects X X X
Dosage Fixed Effects X X
Firm Fixed Effects X
R2 0.392 0.840 0.708
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table D.3: Divestiture Markets
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 3.279∗∗∗ 3.650∗∗∗ 4.162∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.044) (0.047)
t −0.002 −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Merger 1.091∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ −0.805∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.053) (0.067)
Rival 0.948∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.046) (0.065)
Mergeri ∗ PostMerger0−5t 0.007 −0.042 −0.051
(0.106) (0.058) (0.039)
Mergeri ∗ PostMerger6−11t −0.019 −0.060 −0.068
(0.107) (0.058) (0.040)
Mergeri ∗ PostMerger12+t −0.191∗ −0.206∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.050) (0.034)
Rivali ∗ PostMerger0−5t −0.011 −0.003 −0.002
(0.079) (0.043) (0.029)
Rivali ∗ PostMerger6−11t −0.049 −0.033 −0.032
(0.080) (0.044) (0.030)
Rivali ∗ PostMerger12+t −0.084 −0.047 −0.044
(0.073) (0.040) (0.027)
Divesti ∗ PostMerger0−5t 0.062 0.014 0.021
(0.115) (0.063) (0.043)
Divesti ∗ PostMerger6−11t 0.099 0.058 0.024
(0.116) (0.063) (0.043)
Divesti ∗ PostMerger12+t 0.087 0.069 0.034
(0.098) (0.053) (0.036)
Market Fixed Effects X X X
Dosage Fixed Effects X X
Firm Fixed Effects X
R2 0.581 0.877 0.944
Adj. R2 0.579 0.876 0.942
Num. obs. 6005 6005 6005
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
82
Table D.4: Potential Entrant Markets
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 3.370∗∗∗ 3.130∗∗∗ 2.643∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.095) (0.068)
t 0.009∗ 0.010∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Merger −0.109 −0.526∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.074) (0.070)
Mergeri ∗ PostMerger0−5t −0.104 −0.110 −0.118
(0.127) (0.110) (0.063)
Mergeri ∗ PostMerger6−11t −0.201 −0.212 −0.224∗∗
(0.139) (0.120) (0.069)
Mergeri ∗ PostMerger12+t −0.332∗ −0.358∗∗ −0.364∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.133) (0.077)
Rivali ∗ PostMerger0−5t −0.195∗∗ −0.160∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.062) (0.036)
Rivali ∗ PostMerger6−11t −0.281∗∗ −0.235∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.080) (0.047)
Rivali ∗ PostMerger12+t −0.256 −0.200 −0.162∗
(0.135) (0.116) (0.067)
Market Fixed Effects X X X
Dosage Fixed Effects X X
Firm Fixed Effects X
R2 0.794 0.947 0.960
Adj. R2 0.793 0.946 0.958
Num. obs. 3279 3279 3279
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table D.5: No Divestiture Markets
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 2.495∗∗∗ 3.943∗∗∗ 2.807∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.055) (0.048)
t −0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Merger 0.961∗∗∗ 1.870∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.034) (0.059)
Mergeri ∗ PostMerger0−5t 0.047 0.053 0.051
(0.063) (0.044) (0.039)
Mergeri ∗ PostMerger6−11t 0.004 0.039 0.040
(0.068) (0.039) (0.034)
Mergeri ∗ PostMerger12+t −0.059 −0.110∗ −0.108∗∗
(0.074) (0.048) (0.042)
Rivali ∗ PostMerger0−5t 0.101 0.115∗ 0.084
(0.078) (0.048) (0.043)
Rivali ∗ PostMerger6−11t 0.224∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.059) (0.053)
Rivali ∗ PostMerger12+t 0.282∗∗∗ 0.149 0.123
(0.081) (0.080) (0.071)
Market Fixed Effects X X X
Dosage Fixed Effects X X
Firm Fixed Effects X
R2 0.269 0.458 0.824
Adj. R2 0.264 0.451 0.818
Num. obs. 1890 1890 1890
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Figure D.1: Changes in Price After Merger
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Figure D.2: Pricing Path for Sample Market
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